A parar para avanzar
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National Strike in Colombia (April 28th to…)
Translated by Conor Harris.
The morning of Wednesday, April 28th did not bode well for a massive protest in Colombia. The country was at the peak of a third wave of COVID 19 infections, and its hospitals were under a red alert due to the high occupancy rates of Intensive Care Units. The national government, as well as many regional and local governments, had issued a stay-at-home order to avoid infections due to large-scale, open-air gatherings. Moreover, some regional and local governments issued mandatory curfews, prohibitions on the sale of alcohol, and obligatory quarantines. One judge also attempted to contain the mobilisation through an absurd decree that prohibited it. Even the members of the National Strike Committee (Comité Nacional De Paro or CNP) were not entirely convinced that the people would take to the streets. The police, especially the anti-riot force (ESMAD), prepared for what seemed merely another day of protests, which would soon begin to languish. In effect, the first reports did not mention many people in the streets of the capital, nor in the major cities across the country.
Yet as the morning continued, news began to arrive of increasing numbers of protesters participating in ever more forceful actions in mid-sized towns and peripheral regions. Especially in Cali –the third largest city in the country, with the largest Afro-descendent population–, contradictory reports were arising that contrasted massive, peaceful marches with minor groups destroying public transport stations, knocking down security cameras, or entering large stores and warehouse to loot them. There, the morning had begun symbolically, when the indigenous misak tumbled the statue of the conquistador Sebastián de Belalcázar. Stupor became indignation upon seeing, live and direct from the scene, the city’s brutal police response, not only against those attacking public and private property, but against those who were marching peacefully. The same scenes repeated, on a smaller scale, in other large cities, and even in mid-sized cities and small towns. The people, indignant because of this official repression, began to block urban throughways and national highways. The national strike began to overflow the bounds of the initial call to action, expanding its reach, escalating its demands, and radicalising its repertoire.
The following day, amidst reports of deaths and wounded, strikes and blockages, the protest continued. This carried into the following days until Saturday, May 1st arrived, traditionally reserved for celebrating International Workers’ Day. The strike’s organizers attempted to dissuade mobilisations in cities with high rates of COVID 19 infections. The masses, however, paid them no mind, and the national strike continued with ever greater force. The government of Ivan Duque, which had underestimated the magnitude of the protest, retracted the recent measure which had caused this indignation to overflow: a tributary reform that, in the middle of the pandemic, increased taxes on basic necessities and levied taxes on funeral services –at a time when Colombia was the country with the third highest rate of daily COVID 19 deaths! This placed the majority of the tax burden on the middle classes while passing over the business class, who had, in 2019, received tax subsidies which contributed significantly to leaving the state coffers with few resources to confront a crisis like the pandemic. The minister that spearheaded this financial monstrosity, Alberto Carrasquilla, promptly resigned. Thus, the strike achieved its first victory—but at what cost? In the first days, there have been at least 15 deaths during the protests, heavily concentrated in Cali.
The List of Demands
The retraction of the most hated target of popular ire and the fall of the man responsible did not lessen the popular mobilisations; on the contrary, the number of participants took off –some of whom, truck drivers and taxi drivers, joined in the early days of May– and the protests extended to more than half the municipalities in the country. Cali continued to be the strike’s epicentre, but new clashes now took place in Bogotá and other large cities, as well as in medium-sized and small localities (see attached map). The strike did not stop. As of today, May 22nd, despite ups and downs, it continues.
Amid these comings and goings, Duque, who had refused to dialogue with those who called for the strike, finally agreed to call for “negotiations.” The demands, sent by the CNP to the government a year before, consisted of seven points, excluding the tributary reforms: retraction of the healthcare reforms which led to further privatisation and of the labour reform that led to a deterioration in working conditions; basic income for the poorest populations, which represented more than half of the country; defence of national production and food sovereignty; support for small business and investment in employment; zero-tuition higher education; and cessation of the glyphosate fumigation of illicit crops. Beyond these concrete points, they also proposed a long-term agenda meant to address structural problems, as we will see below.
Now we must analyse this enormous popular uprising in Colombia, highlighting continuities with prior moments, as well as its radical novelty.
Continuities and Ruptures of the Current National Strike
Observing the below graphic concerning social struggles in Colombia, we see a distinct tendency towards an increase in protest since 2013. There were several protests that year, of particular note being the national agrarian strike that endured a number of days, with some regional variation, and received significant urban support, especially among students.2 While the number of social struggles decreases beginning in 2015, the average of these years is greater than the historical average and we have seen an increased number of participants. Thus, we arrive at the 21st of November (21N), 2019, which was a massive mobilization, especially on the first day, and included many facets that are being repeated in the current protests. A large number of social sectors participated, both urban and rural, with a variety of motives –in fact, the demands presented to the government at the time included more than 100 points, which covered everything from structural problems to immediate complaints. Although the 21N lasted several days, it began to languish during the prolonged conversations held by the government, the end of year holidays, and the arrival of the pandemic. In a sense, this protest was put on hold, although it was briefly revived in the early days of September 2020 with an uprising against the murder of a person detained by the police, Javier Ordoñez. The citizenry’s unrest manifested as attacks against police stands and public transport stations, and the clashes claimed ten civilian lives.3 During the pandemic the protest did not diminish but, for obvious reasons, it became particularly fragmented and was not as large.
Source: CINEP Database of Social Struggles
As we can see, the current uprising is not altogether new, although it shows signs of noteworthy ruptures. Effectively, as part of the strike that began April 28th, a multiplicity of actors has converged, among whom are hourly workers, healthcare workers, teachers, urban poor, students and the youth more broadly, the indigenous, farmers, Afro-descendent communities, feminists, LGBTI groups, and environmentalists. Later, we see taxi drivers and transportation owners, especially from small and medium-sized firms. The call to mobilise, released two months before and preceded by demands presented a year before, was made by the aforementioned CNP, which consists of unions, pensioner organisations, farmers, students, the indigenous, and women’s groups. Aware that they do not represent the plurality of participants, especially the lower-class youth, who form a large sector of the masses, they therefore have sought out forms of including them or, at least, hearing their demands.
Said demands are equally plural, with some that are longstanding, but which were exacerbated by the government’s handling of the pandemic. That said, there are at least two levels to the list of public demands. One is more pressing and immediate, thus “easier” to negotiate, while the other is more structural, such that time will be necessary to reach an accord. Between these two poles, each day brings new local and regional demands, as new actors join the protests or make their struggles visible.
Among the longstanding structural problems, several stand out as tied to the current developmental model, such as poverty, growing inequality, extractivism, environmental degradation, the management of illicit crops, and crises of health, education, and general wellbeing. To these have been added political elements, such as the persistence of socio-political violence against social leaders, human rights defenders, and demobilised militants –between December of 2016 and April of 2021, 904 social leaders and 276 ex-combatants of the FARC were assassinated.4 Moreover, there exists a subterranean violence against the population, and especially the most vulnerable sectors, which speaks to the deterioration of coexistence and the destabilisation of a multiculturalism consecrated in the 1991 constitution.5 Of further note are complaints concerning the state’s failure to meet the terms of the recent peace agreement and their promises to the indigenous, the Afro-descendent communities of the Pacific, students, rural populations, and an extensive etcetera. To this has been added the weakness of a government isolated from even its own party which, instead of listening to those who elected them, is deaf to all dialogue. Instead, it chooses to use state forces against citizen demands, giving free reign to the increasingly disproportionate actions of the police. This same force was charged with ensuring the population abide by the exceptional measures taken by the national and local governments to confront the pandemic and, thus, had frequent, daily encounters with the youth, especially those of working-class neighbourhoods.
Other factors that have worsened with the pandemic and affect these youths especially, are the marked increase in poverty and inequality. According to the official statistics published by the DANE (National Statistical Administrative Department, in English) at the end of April 2020, poverty –measure by families earning barely more than $300 per month– increased by 6.6%, coming to include 42% of the population, while extreme poverty –measured by families earning less than $180 per month– increased 5.5%, corresponding to 15% of the population. This is hardly all, as according to the same official statistics, the GINI coefficient of inequality is 0.54, one of the highest in the world and the worst in the country’s history. Again, the most affected are the youth: according to official numbers from the DANE, if one compares December 2019-February 2020 with the same months from 2020 to 2021, youth unemployment for those between 14 and 28 rose from 24.9% to 27.7%, with women being the most affected, among whom it rose from 34.9% to 38.1%.6 Given these conditions, it is easy to understand the offense of the tributary reform that sparked the popular explosion, an explosion that has not been quelled by its retraction, as it brought to the surface our society’s deep inequalities.
Violence
The violence of the police response also fuelled this explosion. It was as though they sought to put out a fire with gasoline. According to the NGO Temblores, which tracks this violence, on May 18th there were 2,387 cases of police violence during the Strike: 43 confirmed murders and 8 being investigated, 384 wounded, 33 attacks on eyes, 18 victims of sexual violence –one of them, a minor, took her life in Popayan after being humiliated–, 1,139 arrests, 472 violent interventions by the police, and 146 cases of firearm usage by the same.7 It should go without saying that the majority of the victims are poor youths.
As we examine in a prior work, the police in Colombia have been part of the armed forces since 1948 and have become increasingly involved in military tasks, such as the fight against drug trafficking and the guerrillas, even at times supplanting the Army, and in any case confusing the functions of the two forces. Beyond having a culture focused on the restoration of order, the National Police were, for a long time, driven by Cold War anti-communist ideology, which has been periodically revived by authoritarian governments such as that of Duque. And although training around human rights has advanced, this new orientation is regularly obscured by the urgency of maintaining order, leading to disproportionate use of force, as we have seen during this strike. The Police have seen a significant growth in numbers, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and there are now more than 160,000 officers, whereas there were 22,000 in 1958.8
As we said, the exacerbation of the structural lacks within Colombian society caused by the handling of the pandemic, caused an explosion of public wrath, which was worsened by the brutal police response. This resonated with the strike’s novel aspects, such as its long duration –23 days and counting–, its wide reach –more than half of municipalities have been participating, at least intermittently–, the large number of participants, with moments of impressive highs –for example, in Bogotá on Saturday, May 15th, at the monument to the Heroes of Independence, which has been rededicated to the “heroes of the strike”–, and above all, the protest’s radicality. The sustained waves have caused damage to people and objects and, while not all the violence is understandable, much less justifiable, one must learn to hear the voice of a multitude which is neither being manipulated nor irrational. Quite the contrary, it is active and has its own behavioural logics, to which we now turn.
According to official police data from May 9th, one official was assassinated,9 601 officers were wounded, and there is talk of a female patrol officer being sexually assaulted by protestors on April 30th.10 Moreover, the same organisation reported, on the same day, attacks against 172 busses, with 31 burned; 43 ATMs were destroyed; 99 banks attacked; 98 businesses looted and 254 attacked; 46 public transit stations destroyed; 10 monuments toppled; and a hotel, which housed the ESMAD, was burned.11 If we pay close attention, this is hardly indiscriminate violence, but rather it has precise objectives, despite this not excusing it: locations and elements of surveillance –cameras, police stations and armoured cars–; public spaces associated with state power –official buildings and public transport–; economic spaces –banks and large businesses–; statues –against the symbolic power of colonisers and oppressors. Of course, there has also been damage to private vehicles and small businesses, being unintentional effects of the day’s clashes. There has also been a general tendency towards provisioning, especially in the south of the country, due to highway blockages. Recently, “humanitarian corridors” have been opened at certain points to allow ambulances and trucks with supplies to head to the large urban centres. All of this is the direct result of a long contained public rage.
The government tends to attribute the multitude’s violence to a handful of infiltrators in the protest, whom it often calls “vandals.” We consider this to be an inadequate category, as it discredits and makes an enemy of someone with the purpose of annihilating them. The violence observed in recent days is definitively not due to the presence of professional agitators or infiltration by guerrillas, paramilitaries, or secret State agents. These provocateurs are, without a doubt, present in the protests and striving to worsen the confrontations, but these do not determine the logic of the multitude. Nor does this logic correspond to the wishes of opposition politicians, regardless of their charisma. Even less could one explain this strike via the presence of outside agents, be they of the so-called “castro-chavismo” or from the Forum in Sao Paulo. Without a doubt the examples of other global protests, and especially those on the continent, for example in Chile, influence and frame horizons for action, but they do not determine the direction of the strike in Colombia. By attributing the strike’s logic to external agents or internal infiltrators, generically referred to as “terrorists” or “vandals,” the government and the right-wing parties that support it are striving to revive a Cold War logic by constructing an enemy seeking to destroy the nation. As such, they can deny the protest’s political legitimacy and ignore its demands.
Finally, in Colombia as in the rest of the world, a generational change is occurring and brings with it a new political perspective. This perspective is inclined towards direct action over electoral politics, utilises horizontal forms of assembly that break with the verticality of the union and trade organisations, distrusts institutions and the State, and it counts on solidarity, is fed by social networks, and has a language of its own. In Colombia, since 2013, the new generation has stopped fearing protest.
Conclusion: ¡a negociar para avanzar!
Given these intersecting factors, there is no option but a constructive dialogue that leads to real negotiations. This implies recognising that the protest has legitimate demands and there are valid interlocuters. More than delegitimization, we must strive towards recognition of the other as a different person and not as an enemy. The plurality of actors and interests, of course, makes negotiation more difficult, and more so as time passes, and the confrontations become more severe. There is already a list of pressing demands. In fact, three of these have been achieved by protest, without need for negotiations: tributary and health reforms, and zero tuition for low-income students, at least for the next semester. Two ministers have fallen, those of Housing and External Relations.
As a prerequisite to formal negotiations, the CNP has requested guarantees such as the demilitarisation of the cities, punishment for those responsible for state violence, and respect of the right to protest as consecrated in article 37 of the National Constitution. At the moment (May 22nd), the government has granted none of these guarantees and, instead, demands from the CNP a condemnation of the street violence and the lifting of roadblocks. Thus, the negotiating table has yet to be reached, and several more months will also be required to negotiate with those not represented by the CNP, especially the youths and social actors from remote regions. In the middle-term, one must approach any agenda concerning structural themes with exact timeframes and procedures. The way is long, but the current crisis demands immediate negotiation.
Map
Points of protest in the National Strike
Source: CINEP Database of Social Struggles
1 Ph.D. in History, Full Professor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and researcher with CINEP (The Center for Research and Popular Education). The original text was written in May 22nd.
2 Various, “Luchas sociales en Colombia, 2013”, Informe Especial, Bogotá, Cinep, 2014.
3 Santiago Garcés, “Masacres en Bogotá: elementos históricos y coyunturales para su comprensión,” https://www.revistaciendiascinep.com/home/category/temas/
4 https//www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-de-900-1%C3%ADderes-sociales-asesinados-en-colombia-desde-2016/a-57257906
5 Martha Cecilia García, Ana María Restrepo and Santiago Garcés, “Lo que esconde la pandemia”, https://www.revistaciendiascinep.com/home/category/temas/
6 El Espectador, 30 April 2021, pp. 4-5.
7 https://www.temblores.org
8 It is the second largest armed force after the army, which has 220,000 members. The ESMAD alone has almost 4,000 members, triple the original number of officers in 1999 (Mauricio Archila and others, Cuando la copa se rebosa, Bogotá, Cinep, 2019, cap. 2).
9 This morning, May 22nd, the assassination of another police officer in Cali was discovered. The officer was shot when he attempted to prevent the looting of a chain store (Noticias Caracol, 22 May 2021). However, it is unclear whether it was related to the protest.
10 Noticias RCN Radio, 21 May 2021.
11 El Espectador, 9 May 2021, p. 7.
Mauricio Archila Neira
Ph.D. in History, Full Professor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and researcher with CINEP (The Center for Research and Popular Education). The original text was written in May 22nd.